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A notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance
regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines ε-Nash equilibrium
in a natural way. We show that pi-tolerant equilibrium can explain cooperation in social dilemmas
such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Public Good game. We then examine the structure of particularly
cooperative pi-tolerant equilibria, where players are as cooperative as they can be, subject to their
tolerances, in Prisoner’s Dilemma. To the extent that cooperation is due to tolerance, these results
provide guidance to a mechanism designer who has some control over the payoffs in a game, and
suggest ways in which cooperation can be increased.
1 Introduction
People exhibit systematic deviations from the predictions of game theory. For example, they do not
always act so as to maximize their expected utility in games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma (to the extent
that their utility is accurately characterized by the payoffs in the game). Many alternative models have
been proposed to explain these deviations; the explanations range from players having other-regarding
preferences, so that they prefer to avoid inequity, or prefer to maximize social welfare (see, e.g., [1, 5, 9])
to quantal-response equilibrium, which assumes that, with some probability, players make mistakes and
do not play rationally [17].
The literature here is enormous; a complete bibliography would be almost as long as this paper.
Nevertheless, we propose yet another approach to explaining what people do. Our explanation assumes
that people have some tolerance for not getting the optimal payoff; the degree of tolerance is measured
by how far from an optimal payoff they find acceptable. This idea is certainly not new: it is implicit in
notions like ε-equilibrium and satisficing [20, 21], although the details are different. Moreover, it is clear
that people do have some tolerance. There are many potential reasons for this. First, although we often
identify payoffs and utilities, the payoffs in a game may not represent a player’s true utility; a player
may in fact be indifferent between receiving a payoff of a and a− t if t is sufficiently small. (This is
in the spirit of the “satisficing” view.) Or there may be a recommended strategy, and some overhead in
switching (which again is not being captured in the game’s payoffs). For whatever reason, it seems
reasonable to assume that players may have some tolerance regarding payoffs. However, there is no
reason to believe that all players have the same tolerance. We thus assume that there is a distribution over
possible tolerances for each player, captured by a profile pi = (pi1, . . . ,pin) of distributions, where pii is a
distribution over the possible tolerances of player i.
Intuitively, we imagine that we have a large population of players who could be player i; if we choose
player i at random from this poplulation, then with probability pii(t), she will have tolerance t. (Of
course, in many applications, it is reasonable to assume that all players are chosen from the same pool,
so that pi1 = · · · = pin.) We can relate this to more traditional game-theoretic considerations by thinking
of these tolerances as representing different types of player i; that is, a type is associated with a tolerance.
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There is some psychological evidence to support this viewpoint; specifically, there some evidence that
whether someone uses satisficing-style behavior, and the extent to which it is used, is a personality trait,
with a strong genetic component that endures over time [22]. In this setting, we define an equilibrium
notion that we call pi-tolerant equilibrium. A profile σ of possibly mixed strategies, one for each player,
is a pi-tolerant equilibrium if, roughly speaking, for each type t of player i (i.e., each possible tolerance
that player i can have), we can assign a mixed strategy to type t in such a way that (1) each of the
pure strategies in the mixture is a best response to σ−i (i.e., what the other players are doing) and (2) σi
represents the convex combination of what all the types of player i are doing. Intuitively, the other players
don’t know what type of player i they are facing; σi describes the aggregate behavior over all types of
player i. We can show that a Nash equilibrium is a 0-tolerant equilibrium (i.e., if we take pi1 = · · ·= pin
to be the distribution that assigns probability 1 to players having tolerance 0); moreover, every Nash
equilibrium is a pi-tolerant equilibrium for all pi . Similarly, if piε1 = · · · = piεn all asign probability 1 to
players having tolerance ε , then a piε -tolerant equilibrium is an ε-Nash equilibrium. (The converse is not
quite true; see Section 2.)
After defining pi-tolerant equilibria in Section 2, in Section 3, we review the definition of social
dilemmas, discuss the observed behavior in social dilemmas that we seek to explain, and show how
tolerance can explain it.
Our interest in social dilemmas is only part of why we are interested in tolerance. We are also
interested in taking advantage of tolerance when designing mechanisms. We illustrate the potential in
Section 4 by investigating this issue in the context of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Although Prisoner’s Dilemma
may seem to be a limited domain, it can model a range of two-player interactions with appropriate
meanings ascribed to the actions of cooperating and defecting. Our analysis of Prisoner’s Dilemma with
tolerance isolates the factors that determine the equilibrium level of cooperation in the game, providing
guidelines (to the extent to which tolerance is indeed the explanation for observed cooperation) for how
a designer, who may be able to modify or control the payoffs from certain actions, can adjust them to
achieve particular levels of cooperative behavior in equilibrium.
2 pi-Tolerant Equilibrium
We consider normal-form games here. A normal-form game is a tuple Γ = (N,(Si)i∈N ,(ui)i∈N), where
N is a finite set of players, which for convenience we take to be the set {1, . . . ,n}, Si is the set of pure
strategies available to player i, which for convenience we also take to be finite, and ui is i’s utility function.
As usual, we take S = S1×·· ·×Sn. A mixed strategy for player i is a distribution on Si. Let Σi denote the
mixed strategies for player i, and let Σ= Σ1×·· ·×Σn. Elements of Σ are called mixed-strategy profiles;
given σ ∈ Σ, we denote by σi the ith component of the tuple σ , and by σ−i the element of Σ−i consisting
of all but the ith component of σ . The utility function ui : S→ IR; that is, ui associates with each pure
strategy profile a real number, which we can think of as i’s utility. We can extend ui to Σ in the obvious
way, by linearity.
We take Ti to be the set of possible tolerances for player i. Each element of Ti is a non-negative
real number. For simplicity in this discussion, we take Ti to be finite, although the definitions that we
are about to give go through with minimal change if Ti is infinite (typically, summations have to be
changed to integrations). We identify a tolerance with a type; it can be viewed as private information
about player i. Let pii be a distribution on Ti, the set of possible types of i (under this viewpoint), and let
pi = (pi1, . . . ,pin).
We want to define what it means for a mixed-strategy profile (σ1, ...σn) to be a pi-tolerant equilibrium.
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The intuition is that σi represents a population distribution. If σi puts probability pi on the pure strategy
si, then a fraction pi of the population (of agents who could play the role of player i) plays si. Similarly,
if pii puts a probability pi on a tolerance t, then a fraction pi of the population of agents who could be
player i has type t. Given our view that a mixed strategy for player i really represents a population of
players each playing a pure strategy, in a pi-tolerant equilibrium, we want all players of tolerance t to
be playing a mixed strategy such that each strategy in the support is within a tolerance t of being a best
response to what the other players are doing.1
Definition 2.1 A pure strategy si for player i is consistent with a tolerance t for player i and a mixed-
strategy profile σ−i for the players other than i if si is a t-best response to σ−i; that is, if, for all strategies
s′i for player i,
ui(s′i,σ−i)≤ ui(si,σ−i)+ t.
Definition 2.2 σ is a pi-tolerant equilibrium if, for each player i, there is a mapping gi from the set Ti of
possible tolerances of player i to mixed strategies for player i such that the following conditions hold:
E1. The support of gi(t) consists of only pure strategies that are consistent with t and σ−i. (Intuitively,
a player i of type t will play only strategies that are t-best responses to σ−i.)
E2. ∑t pii(t)gi(t) = σi.
Note that if (σ1, ...σn) is a pi-tolerant equilibrium, then there might not be any type of player i that plays
strategy σi. Rather, σi describes the other players’ perception of what a “random” instance of player i is
doing. Thus, if player i has two possible types, say t and t ′, where t occurs with probability 1/3 and t ′
occurs with probability 2/3, then E2 requires that σi = 13 gi(t)+
2
3 gi(t
′).
Every Nash equilibrium is clearly a pi-tolerant equilibrium for all pi: For if σ is a Nash equilibrium,
then each pure strategy in the support of σi is a best response to σ−i, so must be consistent with t and
σ−i for all types t. Thus, if we take gi(t) = σi for all t, then E1 and E2 above are clearly satisfied.
Moreover, the Nash equilibria are precisely the δ 0-tolerant equilibria, where δ 0 = (δ 01 , . . . ,δ
0
n ) and δ 0i
puts probability 1 on type 0.
It is similarly easy to check that if δ ε = (δ ε1 , . . . ,δ
ε
n ), where δ εi puts probability 1 on type ε , then
every δ ε -tolerant equilibrium is an ε-Nash equilibrium. The converse is not true, at least not the way
that ε-Nash is typically defined (see, e.g., [18]).
For example, consider Prisoner’s Dilemma. As is well known, defecting is the dominant strategy.
Given ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0 sufficiently small such that the mixed strategy δC+(1−δ )D (cooper-
ating with probability δ and defecting with probability 1− δ ) is an ε-best response no matter what the
other player does; thus, both players using this strategy is an ε-Nash equilibrium. However, it is not a
δ ε -tolerant equilibrium if C is not an ε-best response. Interestingly, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [10] de-
fined a (nonstandard) notion of ε-Nash equilibrium where all strategies in the support of a mixed strategy
are required to be ε-best responses. This corresponds exactly to our notion of δ ε -tolerant equilibrium.
Thus, pi-tolerant equilibrium refines Nash equilibrium and ε-Nash equilibrium in an arguably natural
way that allows for beliefs regarding agents’ tolerance. We can also view it as a generalization of ε-
Bayes-Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games. Recall that in a Bayesian game, each player i has a type in
a set Ti. It is typically assumed that there is a (commonly known) distribution over T = T1 · · · × · · ·Tn,
and that a player’s utility can depend on his type. The notion of ε-Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian
1We should stress that although we view a mixed strategy for player i as representing a population of players, each playing
a pure strategy, nothing in the formal definitions requires this. There could equally well be a single player i playing a mixed
strategy.
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game a natural extension of ε-Nash equilibrium. If we take a player’s type to be his tolerance, and take
all types to agree on the utilities, then a pi-tolerant equilibrium is a ε-Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the sense
of the Goldberg-Papadimitriou definition, provided that the ε can depend on the player’s type. That is,
rather than having a uniform ε , we have a type-dependent ε . We believe that focusing on tolerance and
its consequences gives more insight than thinking in terms of this nonstandard notion of Bayes-Nash
equilibrium; that is what we do in the remainder of the paper.
We conclude this section by showing that greater tolerance leads to more equilibria. While this
is intuitively clear, the proof (which can be found in the appendix) is surprisingly nontrivial. Given
a distribution pii, let Fpii denote the corresponding cumulative distribution; that is, Fpii(t) = ∑t ′≤t pii(t ′).
Say that pi ′i stochastically dominates pii if Fpi
′
i ≤Fpii ; that is, Fpi ′i (t)≤Fpii(t) for all t. Thus, the probability
of getting greater than t with pi ′i is at least as high as the probability of getting greater than t with
pii. Intuitively, pi ′i stochastically dominates pii if pi ′i is the result of shifting pii to the right. A profile
pi ′ = (pi ′1, . . . ,pi ′n) stochastically dominates pi = (pi1, . . . ,pin) if pi ′i stochastically dominates pii for all i.
Theorem 2.3 If pi ′ stochastically dominates pi , then every pi-tolerant equilibrium is a pi ′-tolerant equi-
librium.
Proof: See the appendix.
3 Social Dilemmas
Social dilemmas are situations in which there is a tension between the collective interest and individual
interests: every individual has an incentive to deviate from the common good and act selfishly, but if
everyone deviates, then they are all worse off. Following Capraro and Halpern [3], we formally define
a social dilemma as a normal-form game with a unique Nash equilibrium σN and a unique welfare-
maximizing profile sW , both pure strategy profiles, such that each player’s expected utility if sW is played
is higher than his utility if sN is played. While this is a quite restricted set of games, it includes many of
the best-studied games in the game-theory literature.
We examine the same four games as Capraro and Halpern [3], and show that the experimentally
observed regularities in these games can also be explained using tolerance.2
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Two players can either cooperate (C) or defect (D). To relate our results to ex-
perimental results on Prisoner’s Dilemma, we consider a subclass of Prisoner’s Dilemma games
where we think of cooperation as meaning that a player pays a cost c > 0 to give a benefit b > c to
the other player. If a player defects, he pays nothing and gives nothing. Thus, the payoff of (D,D)
is (0,0), the payoff of (C,C) is (b− c,b− c), and the payoffs of (D,C) and (C,D) are (b,−c) and
(−c,b), respectively. The condition b > c implies that (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium and
(C,C) is the unique welfare-maximizing profile.
Traveler’s Dilemma. Two travelers have identical luggage, which is damaged (in an identical way) by
an airline. The airline offers to recompense them for their luggage. They may ask for any dollar
amount between L and H (where L and H are both positive integers). There is only one catch.
If they ask for the same amount, then that is what they will both receive. However, if they ask
for different amounts—say one asks for m and the other for m′, with m < m′—then whoever asks
for m (the lower amount) will get m+ b (m and a bonus of b), while the other player gets m− b:
2The description of the games and observations is taken almost verbatim from Capraro and Halpern [3].
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the lower amount and a penalty of b. (L,L) is thus the unique Nash equilibrium, while (H,H)
maximizes social welfare, independent of b.
Public Goods game. N ≥ 2 contributors are endowed with 1 dollar each; they must simultaneously
decide how much, if anything, to contribute to a public pool. (The contributions must be in
whole cent amounts.) The total contribution pot is then multiplied by a constant strictly be-
tween 1 and N, and then evenly redistributed among all players. So the payoff of player i is
ui(x1, . . . ,xN) = 1− xi +ρ(x1 + . . .+ xN), where xi denotes i’s contribution, and ρ ∈
( 1
N ,1
)
is the
marginal return. (Thus, the pool is multiplied by ρN before being split evenly among all play-
ers.) Everyone contributing nothing to the pool is the unique Nash equilibrium, and everyone
contributing their whole endowment to the pool is the unique welfare-maximizing profile.
Bertrand Competition. N ≥ 2 firms compete to sell their identical product at a price between the “price
floor” L ≥ 2 and the “reservation value” H. (Again, we assume that H and L are integers, and all
prices must be integers.) The firm that chooses the lowest price, say s, sells the product at that
price, getting a payoff of s, while all other firms get a payoff of 0. If there are ties, then the sales
are split equally among all firms that choose the lowest price. Now everyone choosing L is the
unique Nash equilibrium, and everyone choosing H is the unique welfare-maximizing profile.3
From here on, we say that a player cooperates if he plays his part of the socially-welfare maximizing
strategy profile and defects if he plays his part of the Nash equilibrium strategy profile. While Nash
equilibrium predicts that people should always defect in social dilemmas, in practice, we see a great deal
of cooperative behavior. But the cooperative behavior exhibits a great deal of regularity. Here are some
regularities that have been observed (although it should be noted that in some cases the evidence is rather
limited—see the discussion of Bertrand Competition at the end of this section):
• The degree of cooperation in the Prisoner’s dilemma depends positively on the benefit of mutual
cooperation and negatively on the cost of cooperation [4, 8, 19].
• The degree of cooperation in the Traveler’s Dilemma depends negatively on the bonus/penalty [2].
• The degree of cooperation in the Public Goods game depends positively on the constant marginal
return [11, 14].
• The degree of cooperation in the Public Goods game depends positively on the number of players
[15, 23].
• The degree of cooperation in the Bertrand Competition depends negatively on the number of play-
ers [6].
• The degree of cooperation in the Bertrand Competition depends negatively on the price floor [7].
Of course, as mentioned in the introduction, there have been many attempts to explain the regularities
that have been observed in social dilemmas. However, very few can actually explain all the regularities
mentioned above. Indeed, the only approaches seem to be Charness and Rabin’s [5] approach, which
assumes that agents care about maximizing social welfare and the utility of the worst-off individual as
well as their own utility, and the translucency approach introduced by Halpern and Pass [13] and adapted
by Capraro and Halpern [3] to explain social dilemmas: roughly speaking, a player is translucent to the
degree that he believes that, with some probability, other players will know what he is about to do.
3We require that L ≥ 2 for otherwise we would not have a unique Nash equilibrium, a condition we imposed on Social
Dilemmas. If L = 1 and N = 2, we get two Nash equilibria: (2,2) and (1,1); similarly, for L = 0, we also get multiple Nash
equilibria, for all values of N ≥ 2.
256 Games With Tolerant Players
To show how tolerance can explain cooperation in social dilemmas, we first examine the relationship
between tolerance and the parameters of the various social dilemmas we are considering. We consider
two settings. In the first, we ask when it is consistent for a player i of type t to cooperate. In the second,
we ask when it is rational for a player i of type t who believes (as assumed by Capraro and Halpern [3])
that each other player j is playing β sWj +(1−β )sNj to cooperate (i.e., i believes that each other player is
cooperating with probability β , defecting with probability (1−β ), and not putting positive probability
on any other strategy). We write β sW−i +(1− β )sN−i for the corresponding mixed-strategy profile. Say
that a player has type (t,β ) in the second case; in the spirit of Definition 2.1, say that cooperation is
consistent with type (t,β ) for player i if for all strategies s′i for player i,
ui(s′i,β s
W
−i+(1−β )sN−i)≤ ui(sWi ,β sW−i+(1−β )sN−i)+ t.
For a Prisoner’s Dilemma of the form described in Section 3, consistency is independent of the
strategy the other player is using (and hence independent of player’s beliefs).
Proposition 3.1 For the Prisoner’s Dilemma of the form described in Section 3, cooperation is consis-
tent for a player of type t and mixed strategy σ for the other player iff t ≥ c.
Proof: Switching from cooperating to defecting gives the player an additional payoff of c, independent
of whether the other player is cooperating or defecting. Thus, cooperation is consistent if t ≥ c.
We next consider the Traveler’s Dilemma.
Proposition 3.2 For the Traveler’s Dilemma,
(a) cooperation is consistent with t and a mixed strategy σ for the other player if t ≥ 2b−1;
(b) there exists a strategy σ for the other player such that cooperation is consistent with t and σ iff
t ≥ 2b−1;
(c) cooperation is consistent with (t,β ) iff t ≥max(β (b−1),b−β (H−L)).
Proof: If player 2 plays m, then player 1’s best response is to play m− 1 (or L if m = L). If m < H,
then player 1 gets a payoff of m− b if he cooperates (i.e., plays H), and could have gotten m− 1+ b
by making a best response (or L, in case m = L). Thus, he can gain at most 2b− 1 by playing a best
response. This proves part (a). If m = H − 1 and H − 1 > L, then cooperation is consistent iff t ≥
2b− 1; this proves part (b). Finally, if player 1 has type (t,β ), then he believes that 2 plays H with
probability β and L with probability 1−β . Thus, player 1 believes his expected payoff from playing H
is βH +(1−β )(L− b). The best response for player 1 is to play one of H− 1 or L. His payoff from
playing H−1 is β (H+b−1)+(1−β )(L−b); his payoff from playing L is β (L+b)+(1−β )L. Thus,
cooperation is consistent for a player 1 of type (t,β ) iff t ≥max(β (b−1),b−β (H−L)).
For the Public Goods game, consistency is again independent of the other players’ strategies.
Proposition 3.3 For the Public Goods game, cooperation is consistent for a player i of tolerance t and
mixed strategy σ−i for the other players iff t ≥ (1−ρ).
Proof: It is easy to see that, no matter what the other players do, defection (contributing 0) is the best
response in this game, and a player gets a payoff that is 1−ρ higher if he defects than if he cooperates.
Thus, cooperation is consistent iff t ≥ (1−ρ).
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Proposition 3.4 For Bertrand Competition with n players, cooperation for player i is consistent with
(t,β ) iff t ≥max(β n−1(H−1), f (n)L)−β n−1H/n, where f (n) = ∑n−1k=0 β k(1−β )n−1−k
(n−1
k
)
/(n− k).
Proof: Consider a player of type (t,β ). If player i cooperates, he will get H/n if all the other players
cooperate, which happens with probability β n−1; otherwise, he gets 0. Thus, his expected payoff from
cooperation is β n−1H/n. His best response, given his beliefs, is to play one of H− 1 or L. If he plays
H − 1, then his payoff is H − 1 if all the remaining players play H, which happens with probability
β n−1; otherwise his payoff is 0. Thus, his expected payoff is β n−1(H − 1). If he plays L, then his
payoff if k players play H and n− 1− k play L is L/(n− k); this event occurs with probability β k(1−
β )n−1−k
(n−1
k
)
. Thus, his expected payoff is f (n)L. It follows that cooperation is consistent with (t,β ) if
t ≥max(β n(H−1), f (n)L)−β n−1H/n.
From here it is but three short steps to our desired result: First, observe that, up to now, we have
looked at games in isolation. But now we want to compare tolerances in different games, with different
settings of the relevant parameters. Intuitively, having a tolerance of 2 in Traveler’s Dilemma where
L = 2 and H = 100 should have a different meaning than it does in a version of Traveler’s Dilemma
where payoffs are multiplied by a factor of 10, so that L = 20 and H = 1000. Thus, when considering
a family of related games, rather than considering absolute tolerances, it seems more appropriate to
consider relative tolerance. There are many ways of defining a notion of relative tolerance. For our
purposes, we take a player’s relative tolerance to be an element of [0,1]; player i’s actual tolerance in
a game Γ is his relative tolerance multiplied by the payoff that player i gets if everyone cooperates in
Γ. For example, since the payoff obtained by i if everyone cooperates in Traveler’s Dilemma is H, then
the actual tolerance of a player of type (t˜,β ) is t˜H. (Here and elsewhere, if we wish to emphasize that
we are considering relative tolerance, we write t˜, reserving t for actual tolerance.) There are other ways
we could define relative tolerance. For example, we could multiply by the difference between the payoff
obtained if everyone cooperates and the payoff obtained if everyone defects, or multiply by the maximum
possible social welfare. The exact choice does not affect our results.
Second, recall that the fact that cooperation is consistent with a given type does not mean that a player
of that type will actually cooperate. We add an extra component to the type of a player to indicate whether
the player will cooperate if it is consistent to do so, given his beliefs. We thus consider relative types
of the form (t˜,β ,C) and (t˜,β ,D); such a type will cooperate in Traveler’s Dilemma if t˜H ≥max(β (b−
1),b−β (H−L)) and the third component is C. Finally, we need to assume that there are a reasonable
number of players of each type. Formally, we assume that the set of types of each player is infinite and
that there is a distribution on relative types such that for all intervals (u,v) and (u′,v′) in [0,1], there is
a positive probability of finding someone of relative type (t˜,β ,C) with t˜ ∈ (u,v) and β ∈ (u′,v′). An
analogous assumption is made by Capraro and Halpern [3].
With these assumptions, it follows from Propositions 3.1–3.4 that the regularities discussed in Sec-
tion 3 hold.
• In the case of Prisoner’s Dilemma, b− c is the payoff obtained if everyone cooperates, so if t˜
is the relative tolerance, t˜(b− c) is the actual tolerance. Thus, if a player’s relative type is (t˜,β ),
then cooperation is consistent if t˜(b−c)≥ c. Clearly, as b increases, there are strictly more relative
types for which cooperation is consistent, so, by our assumptions, we should see more cooperation.
Similarly, if c increases (keeping b fixed), there are fewer relative types for which cooperation is
consistent, so we should see less cooperation.
• In the case of Traveler’s Dilemma, as we have observed a relative type will cooperate if t˜H ≥
max(β (b− 1),b−β (H −L)). Clearly, if b increases, then there will be fewer relative types for
whom cooperation is consistent.
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• In the Public Goods game, if everyone cooperates, the payoff to player i is nρ . So it is consistent
to cooperate if t˜ρn ≥ (1− ρ). Clearly, as n increases, we should see more cooperation, given
our assumptions. Moreover, tolerance explains the increase of cooperation as the marginal return
increases.
• Finally, in the Bertrand Competition, since the payoff if everyone cooperates is H/n, it is consistent
to cooperate if t˜H/n≥max(β n−1(H−1), f (n)L)−β n−1H/n, or equivalently, if
t˜ ≥max(nβ n−1(H−1)/H,n f (n)L/H)−β n−1.
Clearly, cooperation decreases if L increases. The effect of increasing n is more nuanced. For n
large, β n−1 is essentially 0, as is nβ n−1; it can be shown that f (n) is roughly 1/(1−β )n. Thus, if
n is large, cooperation is consistent if t˜ > L/(1−β )H. What happens for small values of n is very
much dependent on β , H, and L. The actual experiments on this topic [6] considered only 2, 3, and
4 players, with L = 2 and H = 100. For these values, we get the desired effect if β is sufficiently
large (β > .7 suffices).
As we said earlier, of all the approaches to explaining social dilemmas in the literature, only Capraro
and Halpern [3] and Charness and Rabin [5], can explain all these regularities; see Capraro and Halpern
[3] for a detailed discussion and a comparison to other approaches. Of course, this leaves open the
question of which approach is a better description of what people are doing. We suspect that translucency,
care for others, and tolerance all influence behavior. We hope that further investigation of social dilemmas
will reveal other regularities that can be used to compare our approach to others, and give us a more fine-
grained understanding of what is going on.
4 Prisoner’s Dilemma with Tolerance
We now take a closer look at the impact of tolerance on perhaps the best-studied social dilemma, Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. The analysis suggests how thinking in terms of tolerance might help us design better
mechanisms.
The general prisoners’ dilemma (PD) game has payoffs (a1,a2), (b1,c2), (c1,b2), and (d1,d2) cor-
responding to action profiles (C,C), (C,D), (D,C), and (D,D), respectively, with ci > ai > di > bi. To
analyze equilibrium outcomes in PD with tolerances, consider a player i, and suppose she believes that
the other player j will play C with probability α j. Her payoff from choosing action C and action D are,
respectively,
uC = a jαi+(1−α j)bi; uD = α jci+(1−α j)di.
Since D is a dominant strategy in Prisoner’s Dilemma, uD > uC. Agent i is willing to play C if uD−uC is
within her tolerance, that is, if
t ≥ α j(ci−ai)+(1−α j)(di−bi), α j∆Ci+(1−α j)∆Di,
where ∆Ci is the gain to player i from defecting when the the other player plays C, and similarly for ∆Di.
Taking Fi to denote the cumulative probability distribution on agent i’s tolerances, it follows that the
probability that agent i has the tolerance required to allow cooperation is 1−Fi(α j∆Ci+(1−α j)∆Di).
Note that the minimum tolerance at which i can cooperate, which depends upon the probability α j
with which j plays C, need not decrease with α j: If the payoffs in the game are such that ∆Ci > ∆Di (the
gain from defecting is larger when the other player is cooperating rather than defecting), then increasing
α j increases the tolerance i must have to be willing to cooperate.
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Suppose that agents break ties in favor of cooperation, that is, if cooperating yields a payoff within
an agent’s tolerance, that agent will cooperate rather than defect. Call a pi-tolerant equilibrium satisfying
this condition a particularly cooperative (pi-tolerant) equilibrium. Note that if some player with tolerance
t cooperates in a perfectly cooperative equilibrium, then all players with tolerance t cooperate.
It follows from the discussion above that a particularly cooperative equilibrium is determined by a
pair of mutually consistent probabilities of cooperation (αi,α j) satisfying
αi = 1−Fi(αi∆C j +(1−αi)∆D j)
α j = 1−Fj(α j∆Ci+(1−α j)∆Di).
Note that a particularly cooperative equilibrium may not exist in PD, although a pi-tolerant equilib-
rium always does (since both agents defecting is a pi-tolerant equilibrium, no matter what pi is). For a
simple example, suppose that a1 = a2 = 3, b1 = b2 = −1, c1 = c2 = 5, d1 = d2 = 0, and players are
drawn from a population where everyone has a tolerance of 1.5. Now suppose that there is a perfectly
cooperative equilibrium where a fraction α of the players cooperate. Thus, a player’s expected payoff
from cooperation is 3α − (1−α) = 4α − 1; a player’s expected payoff from defection is 5α . Thus,
a player gains α + 1 by defecting. If 0 ≤ α ≤ .5, then a player gains at most 1.5 by switching from
cooperate to defect, so all players should cooperate in a perfectly cooperative equilibrium (i.e., α should
be 1); on the other hand, if α > .5, then 1+α > 1.5, so all players should defect (so α should be 0).
In this example, we have a point mass of 1 on tolerance 1.5, so there is only one type of each
player. This is inconsistent with the assumption in the previous section that the cumulative probability
increases continuously. If we assume that the cumulative probability increases continuously then there is
always a particularly cooperative equilibrium in PD. We provide an analysis here, making some symme-
try assumptions for simplicity. Specifically, we assume (1) symmetry in payoffs: a1 = a2, . . . ,d1 = d2;
(2) symmetry in tolerance distributions: F1 = F2 = F ; and (3) that F is continuous (so that there are
infinitely many types). Under these assumptions, we show that a symmetric perfectly cooperative equi-
librium (where α1 = α2) always exists; this is a solution α∗ to
1−α = F(α∆C+(1−α)∆D). (1)
(Note that for prisoners’ dilemma, 0< F(∆C),F(∆D)≤ 1 since ∆C = c−a and ∆D= d−b are positive.)
Theorem 4.1 (Equilibrium structure.) Under our assumptions, a symmetric particularly cooperative
equilibrium always exists, is a solution to (1), and has the following structure:
(a) There is an equilibrium with α = 0 (in which case (D,D) is necessarily played, so there is no
cooperation) if and only if F(∆D) = 1.
(b) (Uniqueness.) If ∆C > ∆D, there is a unique equilibrium; if ∆C ≤ ∆D, multiple equilibria corre-
sponding to different cooperation probabilities may exist.
We omit the formal proofs; the results follow from applying the Intermediate Value Theorem using the
continuity of F , and noting that the LHS in (1) is greater than the RHS at α = 0 when F(∆D) < 1,
and is smaller than the RHS at α = 1. Uniqueness (and non-uniqueness, respectively) follows from
the fact that the RHS is increasing (respectively, decreasing) in α when ∆D < ∆C (respectively ∆C <
∆D). The idea is perhaps best illustrated by Figure 1, where the intersections correspond to equilibrium
cooperation probabilities α∗. Note that these results depend critically on F , the cumulative distribution,
being continuous.
The next result gives insight into how the probability of cooperation changes as we change various
parameters. As we change the relevant parameters (the payoffs and the probabilities of tolerance) slightly
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(a) ∆C > ∆D (b) ∆C ≤ ∆D
Figure 1: Equilibrium structure for PD.
in a continuous way, each particularly cooperative equilibrium “shifts” slightly also in a continuous way,
so that we can talk about corresponding equilibria; we omit the formal definition here.
Theorem 4.2 The equilibrium probability of cooperation α∗ in corresponding particularly cooperative
equilibria (a) decreases as ∆C and ∆D increase, and therefore (b) decreases as the payoffs c and d
increase, and increases as a and b increase, and (c) “increases” in pi , in that if pi ′ stochastically dom-
inates pi , then the payoffs in a particularly cooperative pi ′-tolerant equilibrium are higher than in the
corresponding pi-tolerant equilibrium.
These results follow easily by noting that for a fixed α , the RHS in (1) is increasing in both ∆C and ∆D;
the value of α at which the RHS equals the LHS therefore decreases when either of ∆C and ∆D increase.
The monotonicity in pi is similar: if pi ′1 stochastically dominates pi1, the value of α at the intersection is
larger with pi ′1 than with pi1.
These results, in addition to providing testable predictions for how cooperation levels should behave
when payoffs are varied in an experiment, also provide guidelines for a designer who may be able to
manipulate some of the payoffs in the game (via either social or monetary means), by isolating the
factors that influence the nature of equilibria and extent of equilibrium cooperation. First, the extent of
cooperation in equilibrium depends on the marginal, rather than the absolute, payoffs: it is the differences
∆C and ∆D that determine equilibrium levels of cooperation, rather than any other function of the payoffs
a,b,c,d.4
Second, perhaps surprisingly, which of ∆C or ∆D is larger makes a difference to the structure of
equilibria, which also has implications for design. If, for instance, the designer prefers a game where
there is a unique equilibrium with non-trivial cooperation, Theorem 4.2 suggests that the designer should
manipulate payoffs so that ∆D, the marginal gain from defecting instead of cooperating when the other
4We must be a little careful here. To do comparative statics, we should consider relative tolerances, for the reasons discussed
in Section 3. Changing the payoff parameters may well change the actual tolerance, while keeping the relative tolerance fixed.
Parts (a) and (b) of Theorem 4.2 hold only for a fixed tolerance distribution.
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player also defects, is smaller than ∆C, the marginal gain from defecting when the other player cooper-
ates. (This might be achieved, for instance, by providing additional rewards—either extra compensation,
or social rewards such as public acknowledgement, to a player who continues to cooperate despite defec-
tion by her partner, increasing the payoff b and therefore decreasing d−b.) On the other hand, if there
is a means to “nudge” behavior towards a particular equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria, a
designer might prefer to manipulate payoffs to fall in the ∆C ≤ ∆D regime and nudge behavior towards
the equilibrium with the most cooperation (again, this could be achieved by imposing social or monetary
penalties for defecting on a cooperating partner, decreasing t and thereby ∆C).
5 Conclusion
We have defined a notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium, which takes into account that players have some
tolerance regarding payoffs. This solution concept generalizes Nash and ε-Nash equilibrium in a natural
way. We showed that this solution concept can explain cooperation in social dilemmas. Although we
focused on social dilemmas, tolerance can also explain other well-known observations, such as the fact
that people give some money to the other person in the Dictator Game [16] (where one person is given
a certain amount of money, and can split it as he chooses between himself and someone else) and that
people give intermediate amounts and reject small positive offers in the Ultimatum Game [12] (where
one person can decide on how to split a certain amount of money, but the other person can reject the split,
in which case both players get nothing).
We also examined the structure of particularly cooperative pi-tolerant equilibria, where players are as
cooperative as they can be, given their tolerances, in Prisoner’s Dilemma. To the extent that cooperation
is due to tolerance, our results provide guidance to a mechanism designer who has some control over the
payoffs in a game, and suggest ways that cooperation can be increased. Since many practical situations
of interest can be modeled as Prisoner’s Dilemmas, these results may suggest how mechanism designers
can take advantage of players’ tolerance in practice.
We believe that a study of convergence towards, and stability and robustness of, particularly coop-
erative equilibria in Prisoner’s Dilemma in an appropriate model for dynamics can potentially provide
useful insights into emergence and sustainability of trust in online economies.
A Proof of Theorem 2.3
In this section, we prove Theorem 2.3. We repeat the statement of the theorem for the reader’s conve-
nience
THEOREM 2.3. If pi ′ stochastically dominates pi , then every pi-tolerant equilibrium is a pi ′-tolerant
equilibrium.
Suppose that σ is a pi-tolerant equilibrium, and pi ′ stochastically dominates pi for all i. We want to
show that σ is a pi ′-tolerant equilibrium. Clearly, it suffices to consider the case where pi ′i dominates pii,
and pi ′j = pi j for j 6= i.
Let the support of pii be {t1, . . . , tn}, where t1 < .. . < tn, and let the support of pi ′1 be {t ′1, . . . , t ′m},
where t ′1 < .. . < t
′
m. For convenience, define t0 = t
′
0 = 0. By assumption, there exists a mapping gi such
that gi(t) is a mixed strategy for each type t with support consisting of pure strategies consistent with t
and σ−i (this is E1) such that ∑nh=1pii(th)gi(th) = σi (this is E2). We want to define a comparable function
g′i. In the remainder of the proof, for ease of exposition, we drop the subscript i (on gi, g
′
i, pii, pi ′i ).
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We start by defining g′(t ′1). This has the benefit of giving the intuition for how to define g
′ in gen-
eral. For ease of notation, we write F and F ′ rather than Fpi and Fpi ′ . Choose the smallest h such that
F(th)≥ F ′(t ′1). Intuitively, type t ′1 should play g(t1) with probability pi(t1)/pi ′(t ′1), g(t2) with probability
pi(t2)/pi ′(t ′1), . . . , and g(th) with probability pi(th)/pi ′(t ′1). This isn’t quite right, since ∑
h
j=1pi(t j) = F(th),
and F(th) may be strictly larger than F ′(t1) = pi ′(t1). Thus, we modify the probability that t ′1 plays g(th)
to (pi ′(t1)−F(th−1))/pi ′(t ′h). That is, g(th) is played with whatever probability is left over after all the
other strategies have been played. Thus, we take g′1(t
′
1), the strategy played by type t
′
1, to be
pi(t1)
pi ′(t ′1)
g(t1)+ · · ·+ pi(th−1)pi ′(t ′1)
g(th−1)+
pi ′(t1)−F(th−1)
pi ′(t ′1)
g(th). (2)
We must show that E1 is satisfied by pi ′, so that any pure strategy in the support of any of g(t1), . . . ,g(th)
is consistent with t ′1 and σ−i. Since consistency is monotonic in the tolerance, and by E1, all the strategies
in the support of g(t j) are consistent with t j and σ−i, it suffices to show that t ′1 ≥ th. Suppose, by way of
contradiction, that t ′1 < th. By choice of th, if t < th, then F(t) < F
′(t ′1). Thus, F(t
′
1) < F
′(t ′1). But this
contradicts the assumption that F ′ stochastically dominates F . Thus, E1 is indeed satisfied by pi ′.
We now define g′(t ′j) for j ≥ 2. We first define auxiliary functions α : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . ,n} and
β : {1, . . . ,m}→ [0,1]:
• α( j) is the least h such that F(th)≥ F ′(t ′j) (so the h in the definition of g′(t ′1) above is just α(1)).
• β ( j) is defined by induction on j. Let β (1) = pi ′(t1)−F(tα(1)−1). Note that β (1) was the quantity
that occurred in the argument above that represented the amount of the probability mass pi ′(t ′1) not
allocated to g(t1), . . . ,g(tα(1)−1), which can thus be allocated to g(tα(1)). For j ≥ 2, define
β ( j) = pi ′(t j)−
(
pi(tα( j−1))−β ( j−1)+
α( j)−1
∑
h=α( j−1)+1
pi(th)
)
.
Again, roughly speaking, β ( j) is the amount of the probability mass pi ′(t ′j) not allocated to the
strategies g(tα( j−1)), . . . ,g(tα( j)).
We claim that, for j ≥ 2, t ′j ≥ tα( j). The argument is essentially the same as that given above for the case
that j = 1. Suppose not. Then, by choice of tα( j), if t < tα( j), then F(t) < F ′(t ′j). Thus, F(t
′
j) < F
′(t ′j).
But this contradicts the assumption that F ′ stochastically dominates F .
Finally, for j > 1, define
g′(t ′j) =
1
pi ′1(t ′j)
[
(pi(tα( j−1))−β ( j−1))g(tα( j−1))+
(
α( j)−1
∑
h=α( j−1)+1
pi(th)g(th)
)
+β ( j)g(tα( j))
]
. (3)
To see that this works, we need to check E1 and E2. For E1, note that the support of g′(t ′j) consists
of the strategies in the support of g(tα( j−1)), . . . ,g(tα( j)). Since strategies in the support of g(th) are all
consistent with th and σ−i, all the strategies in the support of g′(t ′j) are clearly consistent with tα( j) and
σ−i. We showed above that tα( j) ≤ t ′j, so all these strategies are consistent with t ′j and σ−i. Thus E1
holds.
For E2, note that it is immediate from (2) and the definition of α(1) and β (1) that
pi ′1(t
′
1)g
′
1(t
′
1) =
α(1)−1
∑
h=1
pi(th)g(th)+β (1)g(tα(1)). (4)
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It is immediate from (3) that for j > 1,
pi ′1(t
′
j)g
′
1(t
′
j) = (pi(tα( j−1))−β ( j−1))g(tα( j−1))+
(
α( j)−1
∑
h=α( j−1)+1
pi(th)g(th)
)
+β ( j)g(tα( j)). (5)
It follows from (4) and (5) that
m
∑
h=1
pi ′(t ′h)g
′(t ′h) =
n
∑
h=1
pi(th)g(th).
Since the latter sum is σ1 by E2, we are done.
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